Idea and Deed

I want to address here simply what we are to make of the role of the individual in Hegel’s conception of the world. Better yet, I want to ask what is the responsibility of individual in Hegel’s system. Compared to Kant’s conception in the What is Enlightenment essay, wherein the individual must both act responsibly in accordance with the state, while at the same time contributing to a public sphere of political debate, I find it unclear—though interestingly so—what it is that the individual should be doing in an effort to better the state. My first reaction was that the individual—especially those who were not “Men of History”—had almost no task, and almost no freewill, or at least a freewill that has no purport. After some revision, I am seeing that Hegel may be making an interesting move 

There is a passage early in the second chapter (pp 26-28 in the Hackett edition) where Hegel speaks of such “individual interests” that are expressed as passions. Hegel defines these: “What I understand by this word [passion] is human activity stemming from individual interests, from special goals or from self-seeking purposes if you like; but “passion” occurs when people place the entire energy of their will and character in these goals, sacrificing something else that might well be a goal or even everything else” (Hackett Editions p. 27). In these pages, passion seems to be individual force or energy which manifests the dormant Idea. “Men of History” seem to be those who are capable of “letting the most out,” through personal sacrifice, and the ordinary “man” should not envy these men since the Great Men always live troubled lives.

Thinking about this led me to two initial conclusions. The first was that the average person is completely useless, and even if they let their Idea out through passion, it will really amount to nothing. The second conclusions was that there is really nothing that one is supposed to do, since the Idea is contained somehow within the self, therefore the effects of its potential release are predetermined. I’m still not convinced this isn’t the case, but I do see another way of looking at the problem.

What I noticed is just how open Hegel seems to leave the questions of what the Reason and Idea actually are. Perhaps in others works he delves into these topics, but what we are presented with in this Introduction is a rather indeterminate energy that each person can manifest. If we scrape off the historical mold of idea like “the perfect state” and the racial hierarchization, then we are left with a fairly modern concept: each individual has some sort of potential that can make an impact on the development of good in the world. I like this idea just fine. We can all do good! In Bergson’s essay Time an Freewill, he develops the idea that freewill is exactly what is indeterminate in the universe, an idea that (as far as I understand it) would have an enormous impact on twentieth century philosophy.

So. Oddly enough, it seems to me that Hegel has no conception of freewill, since individuals are bound by the Idea inside them, or they have a very modern kind of freewill, which is by necessarily indefinable, and hence unknowable, and which would explain Hegel’s lack of engagement with the question.